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Abstract
This paper analyzes the normative role for civil liability in aligning
terrorism precaution incentives, when the perpetrators of terrorism are
unreachable by courts or regulators. We consider the strategic interaction among targets, subsidiary victims, and terrorists within a sequential, game-theoretic model. The model reveals that, while an ‘optimal’
liability regime indeed exists, its features appear at odds with conventional legal templates. For example, it frequently prescribes damages
payments from seemingly unlikely defendants, directing them to seemingly unlikely plaintiffs. The challenge of introducing such a regime
using existing tort law doctrines, therefore, is likely to be prohibitive.
Instead, we argue, efficient precaution incentives may be best provided
by alternative policy mechanisms, such as a mutual public insurance
pool for potential targets of terrorism, coupled with direct compensation to victims of terrorist attacks.
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Introduction

The four years since the September 11 terrorist attacks have wrought monumental changes. In addition to its staggering human toll, 9/11 effected a
profound transformation in America’s priorities concerning national security, civil liberties, and the role of law. The attacks set into motion a social
and political reshuffling as dramatic as any that this country has witnessed
in the post-war era. Much of this upheaval continues to play out today.
Early policy debates after September 11 addressed immediate exigencies,
ranging from the appropriate governmental role in compensating those suffering losses,1 to ensuring homeland security,2 to the appropriate trade-off
between national security and civil liberties.3 While these concerns remain
significant today, a new issue has emerged: the proper role of liability. Literally hundreds of individual claimants have opted out of the victims compensation fund (VCF),4 and are currently pursuing their claims in federal court.
Under the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act (which
also created the VCF itself), any court adjudicating the cases of opt-outs
must apply principles drawn from state common law.5 The historical rarity
of similar terrorist acts in the U.S., however, has made analogies to existing common law principles awkward, and their ultimate application appears
relatively unpredictable.
Consequently, the policy issues underlying post-terrorism litigation deserve immediate and reasoned consideration, if only because they have now
pressed themselves upon us. Unfortunately, these issues have thus far received paltry attention in the emerging literature on terrorism risk. This
1

See, e.g., the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, 116 Stat. 2322, P.L. 107-297
(Nov. 26, 2002).
2
E.g., the U.S. Patriot Act, H. R. 3162 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of Title
18 of the U.S. Code).
3
Three recent (and important) Supreme Court cases have centered on this question.
See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), and
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
4
See Virgilio v. City of New York, 407 F.3d 105 (2nd Cir. 2005) (holding that
litigation and claims under the VCF are mutually exclusive, and that any party who
makes a claim under the VCF waives all potential civil liability claims, except possibly
against the terrorists themselves).
5
See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 408(b)(2), Pub. L. No.
107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101). The Act also contained a
provision capping exposure of airline defendants in any civil action to the level of insurance
carried by the airlines. Id at § 408(a). Later, similar caps were imposed for the city of
New York, aircraft manufacturers and persons with a proprietary interest in the WTC.
See Aviation Security Act § 201(b), Pub.L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (Nov. 19, 2001).
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paper attempts to fill that void, exploring whether and how civil liability
might play an important policy role in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, and
in anticipation of others like them.
On first blush, civil liability seems an odd vehicle for addressing the
harms stemming from terrorism, particularly since the agents most directly
responsible—terrorists themselves—are usually beyond the reach of civil and
criminal courts. If the law is unable to provide effective incentives for those
who cause harm, common sense would suggest civil liability is a poor institutional choice. Indeed, even though litigation is capable of accomplishing
other goals such as spreading risk, without a meaningful deterrence role litigation is a weak substitute for more direct insurance mechanisms (which
are capable of spreading risk more efficiently).
Closer inspection, however, yields a more complex view of liability’s role.
While the threat of liability often cannot deter terrorists directly, it can
shape the incentives of those who experience harm. For example, the threat
of legal liability may induce various types of ‘targets’ (such as bridges, buildings, public fora, and attractions) to alter their precautions on behalf of licensees, permittees, and other bystanders likely to be affected when a target
is successfully attacked. Moreover, compensation through liability can influence individual “passers-by” in their decisions about whether to venture
out into public fora, where to congregate, and how to protect themselves if
exposed. Finally, the credible threat of liability may affect the strategic interaction among targets that “compete” to avoid the attention of terrorists.
Because terrorism is a central locus for numerous precautionary activities
in the face of a collective risk, it is perhaps less surprising that courts are
seriously entertaining the viability of these claims.
In this paper, we ask whether and how civil liability can improve incentives to take precautions against terrorism. To frame the discussion, we
introduce a formal, game-theoretic model of behavior in which terrorists,
potential targets, and other collateral victims all take the legal system as
a given and take actions that maximize their own individual expected welfare. (We assume throughout that terrorists are beyond the reach of the
civil courts.6 )
Our analysis suggests that, while it is possible to envision a liability
6

We also assume that the state plays a limited role of establishing the applicable
legal doctrines (and potentially helping to underwrite public insurance). In particular,
we do not inquire whether the liability/insurance landscape affects governmental policy
decisions that may affect terrorist activity. See, e.g., Levmore and Logue (2003), who
argue that such exposure, in the context of terrorism, is unlikely to have significant effects
on governmental action ex ante.
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system that promotes fully efficient precautionary incentives, its contours
would tend to diverge substantially from existing doctrinal templates in at
least three ways. First, the “flow” of damages payments may differ considerably from what seems plausible under existing tort law: for example, we
demonstrate that under relatively general assumptions, an ‘optimal’ liability
regime would not allow bystanders to recover against a damaged target for
their injuries; however, such a regime might well allow the affected target
to recover against affected bystanders. Second, an optimal liability regime
would allow damaged targets and unaffected targets to sue one another, and,
under plausible assumptions, would allow unaffected parties to state a claim
for damages against affected targets. Finally, under an optimal liability
regime, it is generically the case that the amount of damages defendants
would pay need not coincide with the actual harm suffered by the plaintiff,
and might prescribe damages even if the plaintiff has suffered no harm.
From a pragmatic perspective, the unconventional forms of liability that
our analysis suggests likely render an efficient civil liability regime an unattractive and politically infeasible approach, particularly if some alternative mechanism could provide similar incentives. Therefore, we argue that a more
direct and plausible mechanism for efficiency would be a form of social insurance (not unlike the 9/11 victims’ compensation fund, but without the
ability to opt out). Indeed, such a scheme would more naturally decouple
compensation from harm (Choi and Sanchirico, 2002), and would have the
added benefit of spreading risk more efficiently than liability.

1.1

Basic Intuition

While the formal analysis appears later, it is worthwhile to explore the intuitive underpinnings of our argument here. There are three sets of externalities presented by terrorism. Addressing them all would create an unwieldy
and likely infeasible liability regime, but failing to correct them all leaves
inefficient decisionmaking in place.
The first externality is the conventional one that a target (such as the
owner of an office building) may not do enough to protect a collateral victim
(such as a passer-by) who might be injured in the event of an attack. On
its own, this motivates the most intuitive form of liability rule, in which a
target owes a duty to compensate a collateral victim. If the building is an
efficient harm-avoider, such a liability rule encourages the building to take
due care in ensuring the safety of those inside and around it. If this were the
only incentive problem, the solution would be standard and straightforward.
However, the strategic behavior of terrorists subverts the effectiveness of
3

this simple liability rule. Since terrorists’ payoff likely increases in the number of casualties they inflict, collateral victim patronage increases the risk
faced by targets. Patrons, however, do not account for the way their actions
“draw fire” onto targets or each other. The result, even in the absence of
any liability rule, is inefficient over-patronage of targets by victims. Introducing liability payments from targets to victims generally exacerbates this
externality. Therefore, while there may be corrective justice or insurance
rationales for compensating individual passers-by, and reasons to encourage
targets to invest in safety, decoupling these transfers from one another may
well be efficiency-enhancing.
Moreover, strategic terrorists also create incentive problems that involve
targets’ interactions with one another. The simple liability rule posited
above does not correct this problem. If terrorists are strategic maximizers,
then the protection decisions of one target can significantly affect the risk
faced by others, even if thousands of miles away. For example, erecting a
new building in a high-risk zone will “draw fire” away from other structures,
yielding benefits to their owners. Conversely, a decision by an existing target
to self-protect by hardening itself may make other buildings more attractive
targets. As a result, targets under threat from terrorism might either overinvest or underinvest in protection. If liability is to address these incentive
problems, it must afford legal claims between affected targets and unaffected
targets.
Given these incentive problems, we find that the optimal liability regime7
has three key features. First, it forces targets to internalize the losses of
individual victims, but optimally redirects all of those payments to a thirdparty (in the case of our model, unaffected targets). Redirection avoids
exacerbating the over-patronage problem. Second, it forces victims to pay
for the risk they draw onto targets and each other, but also redirects at least
some portion of these payments toward third parties. Finally, it requires
targets to internalize any externality risk they impose upon one another
(and their respective populations of individual victims). The combination
of legal actions that would support the above set of transfers, as noted above,
would present significant implementation difficulties within our current court
system.
Our analysis contributes to the literature in a number of ways. Most
7

By optimal, we implicitly wish to convey something less than first best – in which the
terrorist’s activity level could be directly controlled by the courts/regulatory system. Our
benchmark for social optimality, then, is whether the liability system can implement activity levels by victims and targets that are socially optimal constrained by the impossibility
of regulating terrorist actors.
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centrally, it builds on a growing literature concerning terrorism externalities
and, more generally, crime externalities. Several authors have observed that
investments in observable crime-prevention or passive avoidance of crimeridden areas shifts crime risk onto others (Clotfelter, 1978; Shavell, 1991;
Hui-Wen and Png, 1994; Freeman et al., 1996; Hakim and Rengert, 1981;
McNamara, 1994; Newman et al., 1997). These negative externalities to
protection are perhaps even more pronounced in the context of terrorism
(Woo, 2002b; Lakdawalla and Zanjani, 2005).
Complicating this strand of analysis is the existence of important positive
externalities. Ayres and Levitt (1998) have pointed out that unobserved protection against crime may also have positive spillovers, since others in a close
proximity may also benefit from precautionary acts. Similarly, Kunreuther
and Heal (2003) have discussed the case of “interdependent security,” where
self-protection by one target directly reduces risk for others. For example,
effective baggage screening by one airline lowers risk for all other airlines
to which a passenger might connect. In addition, Keohane and Zeckhauser
(2003) have noted that if terrorists prefer to strike densely populated targets,
avoiding such areas has positive externalities. While these and related observations have also been applied to the study of terrorism insurance (Gron
and Sykes, 2002; Lakdawalla and Zanjani, 2005; Levmore and Logue, 2003)
and public policies to deter terrorism (Powell, 2005), the literature has not
specifically considered the appropriate role for liability alongside (or in lieu
of) insurance. We attempt to fill that void here.
Our analysis also contributes to another strand of literature in law and
economics, which concerns the difficulty of using liability rules to regulate non-contractible “cooperative” investments among self-interested parties (e.g., Holmstrom, 1982; Che and Hausch, 1999). In such contexts, it is
frequently impossible for simple liability schemes to induce efficient investments absent some mechanism that “busts the budget” between the investing parties – i.e., a joint tax in the event of a loss and/or a joint subsidy in
the event of a gain.8 Although a popular theoretical mechanism for busting
the budget in litigation contexts is through “decoupling” (e.g., Polinsky and
Che, 1991), where the defendant’s payment may be larger or smaller than
the plaintiff’s recovery, it is often difficult to implement in practice. Our
analysis reveals that complex litigation may function as a form of “stealth”
decoupling without requiring additional apparatus to bust the budget. In
8

See, e.g., Cooter and Porat (2002) (exploring the notion of “anti-insurance”), or
Schwartz and Watson (2001) (exploring renegotiation costs as a potential source of efficient
commitment in contractual settings).
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settings involving an overlapping series of multi-sided investments, complex litigation may provide a way to “decouple” the rents created/destroyed
within a particular multi-sided investment, redirecting them in the form of
damages to another party to the litigation (who plays no role in the joint
investment problem at hand, but might in others). In some situations (such
as the framework we study), an optimal system of budget-balanced, strict
liability payments exists, even though such a system would be suboptimal
were we to constrain our analysis to a single joint investment problem within
our framework.

1.2

Caveats and Preview

There are two caveats to our analysis that deserve explicit mention before
proceeding. First, we abstract from the effects of risk-aversion by considering risk-neutral actors. Although this assumption simplifies our technical
analysis considerably, there are other, more substantively central, reasons
for it. If liability is to play a role independent of public and private insurance provision, it must be by improving the incentives of actors who might
otherwise externalize costs and benefits onto others. Risk-aversion would
produce an additional insurance “rationale” for a liability regime, but it
would be a spurious one, as this role is best played by an active insurance
market. In our estimation, then, the unique role of legal liability should
be to shape incentives, while the insurance market is the best vehicle for
spreading risk.
The second caveat to our analysis is that we assume terrorists to be beyond reach of the courts. To be sure, there may be some situations where
perpetrators of terrorism are subject to civil or criminal litigation, such as
the convictions of Oklahoma City domestic terrorists Timothy McVeigh and
Terry Nichols, or the recovery against the Libyan government for the PanAm
bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland. Although adding this possibility would
be relatively simple, we have chosen not to do it for three reasons. First,
it is inconsistent with what most believe to be the most central and salient
characteristic of most (though certainly not all) terrorist acts: the lack of effective jurisdiction over those most responsible for the harm.9 Second, even
9

It should be noted that currently, a civil lawsuit brought by survivors of the 9/11
attacks is moving forward against alleged financiers Osama Bin Laden’s al-Qaeda terror
network and Afghanistan’s former Taliban regime. Those accused include the country
of Sudan, three members of the Saudi royal family, various Islamic charities, along with
seven financial institutions and the Bin Laden family’s Saudi construction firm. Even if
this suit ultimately succeeds (on vicarious liability grounds), it is doubtful that in general
the financiers of terrorism are well placed to monitor and deter terrorists themselves.
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if some of the assets of terrorists were reachable through the tort system,
they are likely to be limited relative to the size of the harm, effectively making terrorists judgment-proof. Finally, even if terrorists’ attachable assets
were significant, there would be little of interest left to study here, since the
resulting framework would lend itself to a more standard economic analyses
of tort law (Shavell, 1987).
Our analysis proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we briefly explore the
relevant legal issues surrounding terrorism litigation, and conclude that two
sorts of civil liability claims seem at least plausible (though still highly uncertain) under common law tort templates: Victims (such as bystanders and
owners of nearby structures suffering collateral damage) might sue attacked
targets for inadequate precaution; and attacked targets themselves might
sue unaffected targets for “excessive” precautions. Other types of claims
range from exceedingly speculative to absurd, and therefore would probably be unavailable under existing tort principles. In Section 3, we then
move to characterize the socially efficient liability regime in this environment. We demonstrate that while there exists a scheme that replicates the
social planner’s optimal allocation, it necessitates transfers that are starkly
inconsistent with the forms of liability that appeared plausible in Section 2.
We illustrate, nevertheless, that such transfers can be replicated (perhaps
more plausibly and efficiently) outside of the judicial system, through public and private insurance schemes. Section 4 considers various caveats and
extensions to our analysis, while Section 5 concludes. (An Appendix to this
article contains the proofs of the various claims).

2

Terrorism and Tort Law

As noted in the introduction, the 9/11 litigation has constituted an open
invitation for courts to play precedent-setting roles in determining how and
whether to allocate private action recovery rights in the wake of a terrorist
act, when the terrorists themselves are beyond the legal system’s sphere of
influence. Our economic analysis demonstrates that the optimal liability
regime involves unusual combinations of plaintiffs and defendants. This section explores the doctrinal grounds for those possible claims, and whether
or not they would be likely to succeed under existing tort doctrine. We consider four types of civil litigation: (1) suits brought by harmed individuals
(such as bystanders) against affected targets (such as buildings); (2) suits
brought by targets against one another; (3) suits brought by targets against
harmed individuals; and (4) suits brought by unaffected targets against af-
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fected targets.10 We conclude that there may well be good precedential
analogies for the first type of action, and perhaps the second; however, the
third and fourth are decidedly poor fits within modern American tort law,
which may thus preclude the implementation of the optimal liability regime.

2.1

Harmed Individuals Against Attacked Targets

Perhaps the most conventional form of liability claim comes from harmed
individuals (or their heirs) against the targets of terrorist attacks, alleging
inadequate precaution. The kernel of each of their claims would be, in
essence, a common law tort claim consisting of establishing that the target
owed a duty to take reasonable steps to protect the safety and well-being of
victims; that the target breached this duty; that this breach caused actual
and foreseeable harm to the victims; and that such harm can be capitalized
into provable damages.11
Some of these elements are likely indisputable in the wake of a terrorist act. For example, the damages suffered by the various victims of the
9/11 attacks have been well-documented, estimated (conservatively) to be
just under $10 billion. Moreover, assuming it were well-understood how
(and whether) terrorists respond to precautions, one could likely articulate
a reasonable standard of care for target-level precautions, and perhaps even
make plausible inferences about whether a failure to undertake them caused
the victims’ injuries.
One could imagine, however, that plaintiffs might face a more strenuous
challenge in demonstrating that a target’s “duty” would extend to terrorist
acts (as opposed to general issues of building safety). Because it is an issue of law, demonstrating a lack of a cognizable duty is perhaps one of the
strongest weapons that defendants have available in disposing of litigation.
Indeed, many courts are unwilling to allow cases to go forward in discovery
and litigation until the plaintiff establishes that a duty exists. Although
courts have traditionally conceived of duty relatively loosely, state courts
have recently begun to constrain the universe of contexts in which a defendant owes a duty to potential victims. For example, a recent strand of
cases has begun to limit the application of duty to risks that are not reasonably foreseeable.12 Another strand of recent cases have eliminated the
10

As noted above, we are excluding claims against terrorists themselves and the government. See supra TAN - .
11
The approach is slightly different for products liability claims (such as those filed
against Boeing). The differences, however, are not material for our discussion.
12
See, e.g., Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 482 N.E.2d 34, 36 (N.Y.C.A. 1985); Washington
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concept of duty from situations that involved inherently risky activities, in
which a victim has been found to have assumed the risk of a harm occurring
by placing him/herself in harm’s way (such as spectators injured at baseball games, injured skiers, or gun operators).13 Both of these trends might
plausibly extend more generally, precluding liability for particularly unlikely
or speculative causes of an injury (such as in terrorism claims). Within the
current 9/11 litigation, however, Judge Wallerstein has thus far embraced
a relatively capacious view of duty, allowing claims against manufacturers,
the airlines, and the WTC towers to proceed.14
Another potential impediment that victims face in pursuing targets for
conventional tort liability is the doctrine of proximate cause. This doctrine
limits liability exposure to situations where there is a reasonably foreseeable
connection between the defendant’s action and the resulting harm (See,
e.g., Palsgraff v. Long Island Railroad 15 ). A central issue that is likely to
loom large within terrorist litigation contexts is the issue of an “intervening
act” that nullifies proximate cause. A significant body of case law holds
a negligent defendant not liable if a subsequent actor’s injurious actions
interceded in the causal chain between the defendant’s act and the plaintiff’s
injury.16 In the terrorism context, intervening acts of terrorists or rogue
governments also play significant roles. The instrumentality of injury in
cases of terrorism is not a natural disaster or inevitable chain of events,
but a calculated decision by a strategic player to inflict deliberate harm
v. City of Chicago, 720 NE2d 1030 (Ill. 1999).
13
See Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055 (2001) (holding that gun
manufacturers owe no duty to victims of gun violence); see generally Esper and Keating
(2005).
14
In re Sept. 11 Litig., 280 F. Supp. 2d 279, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
15
162 NE 99 (1928). In Palsgraff, the plaintiff’s injury had been caused by an unlikely
chain of events sparked by the defendant’s negligent actions. Notwithstanding the factual
conclusion that the defendant’s breach of duty was the first proverbial domino in a clear
causal chain, Justice Cardozo held that the case could not go forward, since the it was not
reasonably foreseeable that the type of harm suffered by the plaintiff would result from
the defendant’s alleged act of negligence.
16
In a well-known products liability case, for example, a plaintiff sued an automobile
manufacturer to recover on a manufacturing defect that caused the plaintiff’s spare tire to
fall off his SUV while driving on the freeway. Although initially unharmed, the plaintiff
was injured when a third party’s vehicle rear ended the plaintiff’s vehicle while he was
retrieving the tire. The New Jersey Court of Appeals reversed a trial court judgment
for the plaintiff, holding that the intervening act of negligence (both of the victim and
of the third party driver) was sufficient to break the chain of causation begun by the
manufacturing defect. Yun v Ford Motor Co., Sup. 276 N.J. Super. 142, 647 A.2d 841
(1994); See also Brown v. United States Stove Co., 98 N.J. 155, 171-5, 484 A.2d 710
(1984) (manufacturer relieved of liability if superseding intervening cause);
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on others.17 It is precisely these sorts of cases in which the proximate
cause doctrine may have considerable limiting power. The proximate cause
limitation is a distant conceptual cousin of the similar concept noted above
that is working its way into “duty” cases.18 However, unlike the doctrine
of duty, proximate cause is a factual inquiry that courts generally do not
determine at the onset of litigation. Consequently, prospective plaintiffs
would rather be forced to litigate foreseeability issues at the proximate cause
stage (with the benefit of discovery and a jury) than at the onset of litigation.
In sum, it appears that individuals who suffer harm can plausibly state
a cause of action for damages against various “targets” of the attacks (such
as buildings, airlines, aircraft manufacturers, and so forth). At the same
time, however, they are likely to face two significant challenges in pressing
civil liability claims: withstanding an adverse “duty” determination at the
onset, and demonstrating proximate causation at trial. While their chances
are far from certain, a recognizable template for such actions at least exists
within American tort law.
A similar analysis pertains to “collateral” targets (such as buildings on
juxtaposed parcels) that suffer damage because of their proximity to the
primary target. Such cases bear a close resemblance to the individual-ontarget case described above. Indeed, in many respects, collateral targets are
indistinguishable from individual victims who find themselves at the scene
of an attack. Consequently, in what follows we will tend to treat these cases
as equivalent.

2.2

Attacked Targets Against Unaffected Targets

A second plausible tort cause of action might involve suits by damaged
targets against other undamaged targets, possibly even those thousands of
miles away. While such an action seems peculiar on first blush, it can make
sense (as we show later) if one could establish that the latter’s precautionary
acts imposed additional harm on the attacked target by diverting terrorists
to relatively less protected targets.
17
See, e.g., Port Authority of N.Y. and N.J. v. Arcadian Corp., 189 F.3d 305 (3d
Cir.1999); Gaines-Tabb v. ICI Explosives USA, Inc., 160 F.3d 613 (10th Cir.1998); In re
Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, No. 83-3442, 1985 WL 9447, 1985 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17211 (D.D.C.1985).
18
Indeed, Esper and Keating (2005) criticizes the spillover of the foreseeability doctrine
on exactly these grounds. One potential difference, cited by Judge Wallerstein, is that in
the duty context the foreseeability inquiry is a general one, while in the proximate cause
context, it focuses on a specific chain of events that gives rise to a particular type of injury.
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Although there are few templates within American tort law relating to
terrorism to substantiate such a claim, affiliated areas of law may provide
a ready analogy. One area that analogizes reasonably well to terrorism
liability is the law pertaining to liability after natural disasters, such as
a flash flood. In at least some respects, this analogy is a plausible one,
since – much like target hardening – protective measures by a property
owner against a flood (such as the building of a dyke) can enhance the risk
borne by others by increasing their susceptibility to flooding. The doctrinal
analogy, moreover, is inherently interesting because the law governing diffuse
surface water is in a state of doctrinal flux, and existing legal templates for
addressing such problems suggest a wide range of possible legal responses.
One approach favored by a number of states is frequently referred to as
the “common enemy” doctrine, which holds that a landowner is free to use
any and all methods to dispose of surface runoff without fear of liability
to her neighbors.19 Another group of states, in contrast, follow what has
become known as the “civil law” doctrine.20 This rule is essentially the polar
opposite of the common enemy doctrine, and in its pure form imposes strict
liability to his neighbors when his actions to protect his land cause harm
to his neighbors. These two approaches, sometimes in modified variations,
appear to have been adopted in just over twenty states each each.21
In addition, a smaller number of courts have come to embrace a third
doctrine known as the “reasonable use” doctrine. This doctrine, which is
somewhat of a younger than the other two described above,22 lies between
them substantively and essentially is a negligence rule: an owner may make
reasonable use of his land and in so doing, alter the drainage of surface
water up to the point that the alteration causes unreasonable interference
with his neighbors’ use of their land.23 In many respects, the reasonable
19

See, e.g., Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal.2d 396, 50 Cal.Rptr. 273, 412 P.2d 529
(1966); Yonadi v. Homestead Country Homes, Inc., 35 N.J.Super. 514, 114 A.2d 564
(App.Div.1955), petition denied 42 N.J. Super. 521, 127 A.2d 198 (1956); Butler v.
Bruno, 115 R.I. 264, 341 A.2d 735 (1975); Carland v. Aurin, 103 Tenn. 555, 53 S.W. 940
(1899).
20
The name emanates, apparently, from the fact that the only civil law jurisdiction
in the US, Louisiana, is credited with being the first state to embrace it. See Orleans
Navigation Company v. New Orleans, 1 La. (2 Mart. [O.S.]) 214 (1812).
21
See Keys v. Romley, supra (counting jurisdictions); and Annot. 93 A.L.R.3d 1193,
1207-11 (1979).
22
Though a relatively recent phenomenon nationally, the original seeds of the reasonable
use doctrine can be found in New Hampshire during the 19th century. Swett v. Cutts, 50
N.H. 439 (1870); Bassett v. Salisbury Manufacturing Co., 43 N.H. 569 (1862).
23
See Enderson v. Kelehan, 226 Minn. 163, 32 N.W.2d 286 (1948); Armstrong v.
Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4 (1956); Pendergrast v. Aiken, 293 N.C. 201,
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use doctrine replicates the basic templates of nuisance law for surface water
hazards,24 and it is treated as such by the Restatement of Torts.25 Although
still a minority position among jurisdictions (embraced in just under ten
jurisdictions), it is widely perceived to be growing quickly in its influence.26
In these states, however, the duty and proximate cause hurdles discussed
above are likely to recur. In sum, then, the prospects for suit by an attacked
target against other unattacked targets appear to vary significantly from nil
to appreciable, depending on the jurisdiction.

2.3

Attacked Target Against Harmed Individuals

A third potential sort of claim involves a suit brought by a damaged target
against individuals (such as bystanders) who were harmed by the terrorist
act. While certainly counterintuitive, it is at least conceivable (in light of
the above discussion) why such a claim might emerge: A large population of
individuals congregating at a target, the argument goes, presents a natural
attraction for terrorist attention, if terrorists care (inter alia) about how
many individuals an attack might reach. While individual victims recognize
the fact that their presence at a site marginally increases the odds of a
terrorist act, they do not fully internalize the additional cost that their
presence imposes on the target itself (or on each other), which is also subject
to enhanced risk of attack. Consequently, the argument goes, affected
targets argue that the risk of attack was substantially caused (or at least
enhanced) by the presence of victims at the site.
While nothing prevents an affected target from asserting this type of
claim against victims in theory, it seems implausible that such actions would
be successful in practice, for a number of reasons. First, in order to proceed against individuals, it would appear necessary to file a separate action
against each one, a process that imposes substantial fixed costs on the target plaintiff for each suit filed. The extent of damages that the plaintiff
has suffered as a result of each individual defendant’s actions are likely to
be both speculative and small in magnitude, since any individual victim
imposes only incremental risks on a target. It therefore seems plausible
that the cost of filing suit against each bystander victim defendant would
236 S.E.2d 787 (1977); Butler v. Bruno, 115 R.I. 264, 341 A.2d 735 (1975); Annot. 93
A.L.R.3d 1193, 1216-21 (1979).
24
Pendergrast v. Aiken, 293 N.C. 201, 236 S.E.2d 787 (1977).
25
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 833 (1979).
26
It is also beginning to infiltrate the other two doctrines, which in some jurisdictions
have begun to embrace some components of fault.
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greatly exceed the prospective damages that a plaintiff-target might reasonably expect in such a suit.27 Second, to the extent that individuals are in a
contractual relationship with the targets (such as employees and lessees at
the WTC), the target can use the terms of such relationships to regulate her
exposure by limiting the extent to which these contractual counterparties
are present on site.28 Finally, and perhaps most saliently, because of the human element of tragedy that attends death and injury of individual victims,
it would almost certainly be politically unpalatable for a target-plaintiff to
proceed against a population of sympathetic victims, notwithstanding what
optimal deterrence theory may dictate. It is telling that to our knowledge,
no such actions have actually been filed in the 9/11 litigation.29

2.4

Unaffected Targets Against Attacked Targets

Finally, and for the sake of completing the permutations at play, one might
consider the possibility that unaffected targets could bring suit against attacked targets. Here, it is difficult to imagine what tort theory an unaffected target might have at its disposal. Indeed, unaffected target-plaintiffs
would face a seemingly insurmountable burden demonstrating that they suffered any harm whatsoever (either actually or proximately); similarly, such
a plaintiff would be unable – virtually by definition – to prove damages.
Add to this the politically unsavory notion of an undamaged target collecting from a damaged one, and it seems relatively certain that actions such
as this will fail.

2.5

Synthesis and Analytic Typology

Our analysis of existing templates in tort law has been necessarily brief,
but it does generate a general framework for thinking about the likely tort
claims that harmed individuals and targets are likely to encounter after a
terrorist act. First, for most courts wading into this terrain, it is overwhelmingly likely that the terrorist actors themselves cannot be made to answer
27

These problems become even more intractable under a negligence standard. Indeed,
because numerous victims are likely to act independently of one another in an uncoordinated fashion, it would be difficult to determine which sub-population of defendants was
responsible for violating the negligence standard – i.e., that point at which the marginal
social cost of an additional victim at a site exceeds the marginal social benefit. See section
, infra.
28
This argument, obviously, does not apply to bystanders, passers-by, and others not
in contractual privity with the target – a distinction we revisit below.
29
Although not discussed in the text, it also seems quite implausible (and self-defeating)
for harmed individuals to make claims against one another for overpopulating a site.
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for their own activities, limiting the court’s response to a type of “secondbest” allocation of rights among the terrorists’ victims and targets (actual
or potential). Second, suits by harmed individuals against affected targets
appear to be the most viable jurisprudentially, but they are likely to face stiff
challenges on both duty and proximate cause grounds. Third, suits by damaged targets against unaffected targets for alleged excessive precautions are
unorthodox, but find at least some plausible analogical templates within existing case law. Here too, though, duty and proximate cause arguments may
present significant obstacles, depending on jurisdiction. Fourth, it appears
extremely unlikely (for both practical and economic reasons) that damaged
targets can sue individual victims for “overpopulating” the site and drawing terrorists’ fire. And finally, it seems wholly implausible that unaffected
targets could bring successful claims against attacked targets.
How, then, are courts likely to resolve the uncertainty regarding duty
and causation? Based on a doctrinal analysis alone, it is difficult to make
predictions with absolute certainty. However, the doctrines discussed above
are thought to rest heavily on policy considerations about the nature and
effects of liability. And, one important set of policy considerations concerns
how liability affects individual incentives, and in turn allows policymakers
to navigate a large set of trade-offs between social costs and social benefits
implicit in acts of terrorism precautions. In the section that follows, then,
we posit and analyze a formal model of behavior that makes these costs and
benefits explicit.
Before proceeding, however, we pause briefly to consider the role of contractual relations among the potential parties. As noted above, at least
some individuals harmed by a terrorist attack are likely to be in a contractual relationship with the target. In such situations, at least where the
contractual vehicle functions well, the terms of their contract may be able
to deal with at least some of the collective action problems between the
aforementioned parties. Entry fees, rental/lease terms, capacity restrictions, conditions of occupancy, office management, and other contractual
mechanisms allow the parties to affect – either directly or indirectly – a
large set of precautionary activities at a given target without the aid of
tort law. In contrast, other parties, such as bystanders, are not in a contractual relationship with targets (or one another), and tort law is likely to
be a more effective vehicle for completing the market. In addition, there
may yet be other parties (such as subway or food court patrons), who are
in a limited contractual relationship, which may not be sufficiently rich to
allocate terrorism risk reliably.
In what follows, then, we will tend to distinguish between (1) individuals
14

who are in either no contractual privity with targets or a relatively monolithic one, from (2) individuals who have a relatively nuanced contractual
relationship with targets. To the extent that the latter group specifically
contracts with terrorism risk in mind, courts may wish simply to effectuate
those risk allocations. We therefore treat this latter group in what follows as roughly coterminous with the “target” in the analysis that follows,
concentrating principally on the former group, who we label as individual
“victims.”30

3

An Incentive-Based Model of Terrorism, Precautions, and Liability

As noted in the previous section, an important goal of liability policy is to
improve the allocation of resources by providing individuals with efficient
incentives in a “second-best” world where the perpetrators of terrorism are
beyond courts’ jurisdiction. While pure incentive problems are far from the
only policy goals in the case of terrorism — problems of efficient risk-bearing
and the provision of public goods like national security are also significant
factors — incentive provision is both important in the overall policy landscape and uniquely amenable to a liability solution. In this section, we
explore the incentive problems created by terrorism and how a liability system could solve them.
As noted above, our analysis considers a number of different types of
parties: Actual or potential targets hit by a terrorist attack; collateral targets (such as adjacent buildings) that are not targeted themselves but suffer
significant damage from their proximity to the affected target; individual
victims (such as vendors or employees) who are in contractual privity with
targets; and victim bypassers who are not in contractual privity with targets.
In order to simplify our analysis, we will lump targets together with others
that are in relatively nuanced contractual privity with targets, assuming that
they will allocate their joint risks efficiently amongst themselves.31 These
30

Notably, to the extent that targets and their contracting parties do not account for
the welfare of bystanders or other targets, courts may still wish to impose liability on
them as a collective unit.
31
This group includes owners of buildings, landmarks, shopping centers, government
offices, well-known business, and the like, that might be the locus of a terrorist’s targeting
activities. It may also (depending on the nuance of their contractual relationship) including lessees, employees, and the like. As noted in the text, there is perhaps less to be gained
by tort claims when complete contracts can be written by rational, welfare-maximizing
agents.
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groups will simply go under the banner of “Targets”. We will also lump
together collateral targets with bystanders, since their legal claims would be
similar (see above), and since neither is likely to be in contractual privity
with the targets. We will refer to these groups generically as “Victims.”32
As already noted, a key assumption running throughout our analysis
concerns the impossibility of reaching the terrorists themselves who are the
most directly responsible for the injury suffered. Also, and as already noted,
we exclude as impractical any suits brought against an individual victim for
his/her incremental contribution to the likelihood of an attack. With these
caveats in mind, our formal analysis proceeds in three stages. First, we
develop an economic environment in which terrorists, targets, and victims
interact with one another. Second, we characterize equilibrium behavior
within this framework in the absence of liability and describe its welfare
effects. And finally, we ask whether a prudently designed liability system
could improve upon this equilibrium in welfare terms. In order to focus
solely on incentives (rather than insurance), we assume that all players in
our model are risk-neutral.

3.1

Framework

Consider a single terrorist group contemplating whether to attack one or
more of N particular targets. The targets are assumed to be evenly spaced
along
© a circle
ª of (normalized) circumference 1 and have respective locations
N 33
of N1 , ..., N
. Successful attacks depend on planning and preparation. To
that end, terrorists invest in preparation against each target i, denoted as ri ,
where i = 1, 2, ..., N. The terrorist group has total resources R to allocate
among attacking targets, as well as a non-violent activity (e.g., political
rallies, bake sales, etc.) that yields an expected payoff of Γ(A), where Γ is
twice differentiable, increasing, and strictly concave. Terrorists allocate their
resources to maximize their expected utility, described specifically below.
In the event of a successful violent attack, a potential target is assumed
to suffer a loss L, assumed (for simplicity) to be identical across targets. In
32

This definition abuses terminology somewhat, since all affected individuals/groups/entities can be appropriately thought of as ‘victims’; we have used a narrower
definition here to distinguish between primary victims (“Targets”) and secondary victims
(our use of “Victims” stated in the text). The key distinction is that targets can directly
control the level of protection against terrorism, while victims cannot, save for relocating
themselves away from high-risk areas. Consistent with the discussion in note 31, victims
are assumed unable to write complete ex ante contracts with targets.
33
This distribution is not relevant to the terrorists, but is to the victims, as we describe
below.
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addition, however, each target i may also have vi victims present on site.
From the attack, the terrorist group gains utility of B(L, vi ) for each target
i that is successfully attacked, where B (.) is assumed to be increasing in
both its arguments.
Targets can reduce their probability of loss by investing in self-protection,
but their decision problem is influenced by the behavior of terrorists and
victims. In particular, the probability of a successful attack against target
i is a function of terrorist preparation ri and target protection si , as in
ρ(si , ri ), where we make the intuitive assumptions that ρs < 0, ρr > 0,
ρss > 0 and ρrr < 0. We also assume that self-protection measures thwart
the marginal effectiveness of terror investments, so that ρrs < 0. Against
a “harder” target, terrorists have to spend more resources to increase their
probability of success by a given amount. Victim behavior influences the
incentives of terrorists to attack a particular target. Given the anticipated
decisions of victims and terrorists, targets minimize the expected sum of
protection costs, uncompensated losses, and damages (if any) that must be
paid to victims and/or other potential targets.
Finally, “victims” also suffer in the event of an attack if they find themselves near (or inside) an affected target. In contrast to targets, however,
victims have no control over the on-site protection decisions of targets. The
only way victims can protect themselves is to locate in safer areas. Victims’
initial locations are assumed to be distributed uniformly around the unit
circle, and indexed by k ∈ (0, 1]. They can choose to “stay at home” or patronize one of the N targets. They derive utility G0 > 0 from their outside
option of staying home. The spatiality of the model reflects the fact that
victims might have heterogeneous preferences across location, even holding terrorism risk constant. Patronizing any target ¯i provides
the payoff
¯
¯k − i ¯ , and to bear
of G > G0 , but requires
her
to
“travel”
the
distance
N
¯¢
¡¯
travel costs of γ ¯k − Ni ¯ . We assume that γ (0) = 0, γ ′ > 0, and γ ′′ > 0.
Consequently, γ is invertible, and we therefore define the function θ (y) to
denote γ −1 (y) .34 Subsidiary victims maximize the net payoff from their
patronage decision, taking account of both travel costs and uncompensated
injury from possible terrorist attacks (described in more detail below).35
′
′′
Note that
¡ 1 θ¢(0) = 0, θ > 0, and θ < 0. We also make a technical assumption that
G − G0 < γ 2N , so that the victims who are furthest away from any target will simply
choose to stay home, even in the absence of terrorist risk. Relaxing this assumption, we
conjecture, has little effect on our results.
35
Our framework implicitly assumes that victims capture all the gross surplus (G)
from their decision to patronize a target. This assumption seems natural, since the lack
of a contractual relationship makes it difficult for the target to extract any of the victim’s
34
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Figure 1 below captures the sequence of the game. Because target
decisions are most likely to be durable (e.g., building a skyscraper), we
assume that primary targets move first, and that they each install their
self-protection level si upon moving. After observing target self-protection,
victims move second, setting aggregate patronage levels, vi , for each target.
After observing both self-protection measures and patronage at each target,
terrorists move last. We assume that the actions taken by each actor are
observable to all involved.Note that this description fully defines a sequential
game under complete information.

3.2

Equilibrium and Welfare in the Absence of Liability

To analyze equilibrium behavior in this game, we begin by characterizing
predicted play in the benchmark case where no party can seek compensation through the tort system. This reveals the externalities that an optimal
liability regime must address, but it is also a plausible outcome in its own
right, as pending terrorism litigation may ultimately prove unsuccessful. To
characterize the equilibria of the game, we employ standard backward induction techniques, beginning with the terrorists, then moving to the secondary
victims, and then finally moving to primary targets.
3.2.1

Terrorists

Terrorists observe ~s = {s1 , ..., sN } and ~v = {v1 , ..., vN } , and allocate their
own resources ~r = {r1 , ..., rN } to solve the following problem:
max Γ(A) +

{~
r,A}

s.t. A +

N
X

ρ(si , ri )B(L, vi )

i=1

N
X

(3.1)

ri ≤ R

i=1

Given the concavity of ρ in ri , for any given {~s, ~v } the first order conditions
of this problem are both necessary and sufficient for a unique maximum,
and are as follows:
Γ′ (A) = ρr (si , ri )B(L, vi ), ∀i ∈ {1, .., N }

(3.2)

surplus. Nevertheless, all of our results would follow if we assumed that the target captured
some portion of the victims’ surplus (so long as the patronizing victims as a whole retained
some complementary portion of it).
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Figure 1: Sequence of moves.
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The interpretation of these conditions is fairly standard. The terrorists allocate resources so that the expected marginal productivity of investments
is equal across all targets and the non-violent activity. Thus, for example,
when one target increases its own protection, it becomes marginally less
attractive to terrorists. This shock to their rates of return then induces terrorists to shift resources toward their other alternatives: attacking different
targets and investing more in the nonviolent activity. Similarly, if a specific
target is patronized by more victims, then that target becomes more attractive to the terrorist group, causing it to shift resources marginally away from
other targets and the nonviolent activity, and toward the more-patronized
target.
Formally, these intuitions can be summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1. Under an optimal allocation of resources by the terrorist group,
and for a given {~s, ~v } , ri is uniquely defined, strictly decreasing in si and
v−i , and strictly increasing in s−i and vi . Moreover, for all j, A is strictly
increasing in sj and strictly decreasing in vj .
The uniqueness follows directly from the global concavity of the terrorists’ decision problem, conditional on victim and target decisionmaking.
The effect of the underlying parameters on terrorist behavior is proven in
Lakdawalla and Zanjani (2004).36 Perhaps the most important aspect of
Lemma 3.1 is the fact that the resource allocation for a given location i can
turn, in part, on actions taken by victims and targets at different locations
(−i). For example, enhanced protection efforts by a remote target (s−i ) can
shift risk toward target i as the terrorist group removes marginal resources
from the better-protected target and reallocates them to others. Similarly,
greater patronage at a remote target (v−i ) can shift risk away from target
i as the increased patronage makes the remote target more attractive, and
the terrorist group attempts to increase its resource expenditures there.
In what follows, we shall refer to these cross-target effects as “riskshifting,” since activities at one target tend to shift risk onto (or away from)
other targets. In contrast, the changes that patronage/self-protection have
in channelling terrorist efforts into (or away from) nonviolent activities we
will call “deterrence,” because it reduces the total level of investment in violent terrorism that society must bear. Both target protection and victim
precaution have risk-shifting and deterrence effects. Target self-protection
both enhances deterrence on the margin (a positive externality) and shifts
some marginal risks onto other targets (a negative externality). Similarly,
36

Lakdawalla and Zanjani (2004) proves the result for si ; the result for vi is symmetric.
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a reduction in victim patronage contributes to deterrence (a positive externality) and shifts risk onto other targets (a negative externality).
Analysis of the terrorist’s first order conditions also yields the following
result:
Lemma 3.2. Under an ¯optimal
group,
¯ ¯allocation¯ of resources
¯
¯ ¯ by
¯ the terrorist
¯ ∂ri ¯ ¯P ∂r−i ¯
¯ ∂ri ¯ ¯P ∂r−i ¯
and for a given {~s, ~v } , ¯ ∂si ¯ > ¯ −i ∂si ¯ and ¯ ∂vi ¯ > ¯ −i ∂vi ¯ ∀i.

Essentially, Lemma 3.2 states that deterrence and risk-shifting are generally always present simultaneously. Self-protection by a target reduces
terrorist activity against that target by more than the additional activity it
diverts to other targets. Thus, while target hardening does shift risk, it has
a net deterrent effect in the aggregate. Similarly, victim patronage transfers
risk to other targets, but it also draws resources away from the non-violent
activity, and thus erodes net deterrence in the aggregate.
3.2.2

Subsidiary Victims

Having characterized the unique optimal choice for the terrorist group, we
now consider how subsidiary victims behave in light of the terrorist’s anticipated strategy profile. It is important to distinguish precisely between
victims’ internal costs, and the costs that they externalize onto targets. The
latter externalities would form the basis for an optimal liability scheme, if
one is to be formed.
Recalling the incentives and cost structure faced by each victim, each
victim considers what target (if any) she will visit during the period, an
action we denote by h. For each victim at location k, h (k) = i denotes
a decision by that victim to spend time at target i. In addition, victims
can choose to spend time away from all targets (i.e., they “stay home”), an
activity we denote by h (k) = 0. Thus, the action Rset for victims is given by
h (k) ∈ {0, 1, ..., N } . It is easily verified that vi = h(k)=i dk denotes the size
of the sub-population patronizing target i, for i ∈ {1, ..., N } .
As noted above, victims receive payoff G from patronizing ¡¯
any target
¯¢
(rather than staying home), but must also bear travel costs of γ ¯k − Ni ¯ ,
to patronize that location. In addition, however, all victims suffer personal
losses should their patronized target be successfully attacked (in addition to
any loss suffered by the target itself). In particular, each subsidiary victim
spending time at that target suffers a negative shock D to her welfare. Consequently, the net payoff to victim k from patronizing target i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N }
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is

¯¶
µ¯
¯
i ¯¯
¯
G − γ ¯k − ¯ − ρ (si , ri ) D
N

(3.3)

while the net payoff for the outside (safe) activity remains constant at G0 .
Note, however, that victims do not account for the losses of targets, even
though they may be partly responsible for the risk that targets face.
Assuming that all targets have a positive number of victims (which will
be confirmed in equilibrium), the identity of the “marginal” victim, k ∗ , who
is indifferent between patronage at target i and staying at home, is given by
the following expression:37
¯¶
µ¯
¯ ∗
i ¯¯
¯
(3.4)
G − G0 = γ ¯k − ¯ + ρ (si , ri (v1 , ..., vN )) D, i = 1, ..., N
N

This expression implies that victims located within the radius θ (G − G0 − ρ (si , ri (v1 , ..., vN )) D)
of target i will patronize it. Note that the right-hand side of the above
expression is strictly increasing in k ∗ , so the interval [−k ∗ , k ∗ ] is uniquely
defined. Aggregate patronage of each target i is then given by38 :
→
→
vi = 2θ (G − G0 − ρ (si , ri (−
s ,−
v )) D)

(3.5)

All else equal, victims will tend to move toward more protected targets
and avoid less protected ones. Moreover, since an increase in protection by
any one target decreases aggregate risk, it will also increase the aggregate
number of victims who patronize at-risk targets. Formally, we have:
Lemma 3.3. Under an optimal allocation of resources by the terrorist group
and optimal choices by victims, and for a fixed {~s} , the patronage of any
target i, vi , is uniquely defined, strictly¯increasing
¯ ¯ in si and
¯ v−i , and strictly
¯ ∂vi ¯ ¯P ∂vi ¯
decreasing in s−i . Moreover, for all i, ¯ ∂si ¯ > ¯ −i ∂s−i ¯ .
The results of Lemma 3.3 are analogous to the argument made by Lemma
3.2. An aggregate reduction in risk increases the aggregate number of victims choosing to venture out to targets. This reaction is likely to have a

37
The
P reader will note that this set of first order conditions leaves out the constraint
that N
i=1 vi ≤ 1. This constraint will tend not to be binding so long as victims find it
optimal to spend at least some time in the outside activity. We will constrain our analysis
to parametric contexts where this condition is satisfied in what follows.
38
And consequently, the total number of potential victims who pursue the safe option
is:
N
X
→
→
v =1−Σ·v =1−
2 · θ (G − G − ρ (s , r (−
s ,−
v )) D)
0

i

0

i=1
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i

i

significant effect on target activities. While, as demonstrated above, selfprotection can shift risk onto other targets, these gains come at the cost of
drawing in additional subsidiary victims, who are attracted by the enhanced
fortifications. On the margin, then, targets must weigh the private benefits they receive by shifting risks and effecting deterrence, against attracting
more victims (and thwarting their own precautions) on the other.
3.2.3

Targets

We now step back to the initial stage of the game, in which primary targets
have the opportunity to make self-protection decisions. Recall that in the
event of a successful attack, target i suffers losses L, but may invest resource
si to dampen the probability of a successful attack. Like the other parties,
primary targets behave strategically, and understand the nature of the subsequent structure of the game analyzed above: i.e., once targets’ investments
are sunk and observed, victims will then optimize across locational choices,
and then the terrorists will optimize across investments in attacking targets
and carrying out nonviolent political activity.
Consequently, each target i makes protection decisions that maximize
its expected payoff, solving the following:
min ρ(ri (si , s−i ), si ) · L + si
si

(3.6)

This problem has the first order condition for each target i :
dri
ρs (ri , si ) · L + ρr (ri , si ) ·
1 =0
· L + |{z}
|
{z
}
dsi
{z
}
|
MC
Direct Effect

(3.7)

Indirect Effect

The intuition behind this condition is relatively straightforward. On the
one hand, increasing si imposes a direct marginal cost of 1 on the target,
reflected in the final term on the left hand side of (3.7). On the other hand,
by enhancing self-protection, the target is able to affect the probability of an
attack in both direct and indirect ways. A larger value of si directly reduces
the probability of an attack by acting on the ρ (.) function, represented
by the first term on the left hand side of (3.7). In addition, however, a
larger value of si has indirect effects by altering the strategies of victims
and terrorists, and changing the equilibrium value of ri in the continuation
game, represented by the second term on the left hand side of (3.7) .
Note that the direct effect depicted in (3.7) is strictly negative, and thus
there are always direct benefits to investing in precautions. However, the
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indirect effect is somewhat more complicated to sign, since the equilibrium
dri
has multiple, countervailing effects. The decomposipartial derivative ds
i
tion of this derivative yields the following:
−

+

+

}|
{
z}|{ z }| { z
∂ri
∂ri ∂vi X ∂ri ∂vj
dri
=
+
+
dsi
∂si ∂vi ∂si
∂vj ∂si

(3.8)

j6=i

Equation (3.8) represents the equilibrium impact of target 1’s own protection on its own risk. In general, the sign of this term is ambiguous: For, on
the margin, a target’s own protection may not make it safer, because it may
draw in enough victims to offset the effect of protection. In any interior
equilibrium, however, the marginal impact of self-protection on terror investments must be negative, or targets would not expend valuable resources
on it. The external effects of protection on other targets though remain
ambiguous in equilibrium.
By placing on ρ sufficient technical regularity conditions,39 one can show
dri
dri
dri
that, ds
< 0 for all values of si , limsi →∞ ds
= 0; and limsi →∞ ds
= −∞.
i
i
i
However, these conditions are merely sufficient for the optimal choice to be
finite and strictly positive. They do not guarantee the global concavity of
the target’s problem. To guarantee concavity (and a unique local optimum),
it is necessary to make one additional assumption:
Assumption A1:

The following condition holds everywhere:

ρss (ri , si ) + [2ρrs (ri , si ) + ρrr (ri , si )] ·

dri
d 2 ri
+ ρr (ri , si ) · 2 < 0 (A1)
dsi
dsi

Condition (A1) is merely the second order condition for global concavity.
It is possible to weaken this assumption, at the expense of complicating the
analysis somewhat. In particular, violation of (A1) implies that there may
be multiple local minima from which to choose, and it may be possible that
the optimal protection choice might “jump” from one local minimum to
another with a perturbation in the economic environment. Assumption A
prevents such jumps from occurring.
3.2.4

Equilibrium

By construction, we have shown that for a given ~s, the optimal strategies of
the subsidiary victims and targets are uniquely defined. Moreover, we have
39

The derivation is available from the authors.
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demonstrated that the optimal si for each target is almost always unique.
We now show that, under the conditions described earlier, there is only one
symmetric equilibrium, according to the following:
Proposition 3.4. If Assumption A1 holds, there is a unique symmetric
equilibrium of the no liability game, which is characterized by (3.7), (3.5),
and (3.2).
The symmetry comes from the even spacing of targets and victims, the
equal value of each target, and the symmetric position of the targets in choosing their strategies simultaneously. Let the symmetric equilibrium
© N L N L described
ª
by the above system with no liability be denoted by s , v , rN L . In
what follows, we constrain our attention in all cases to this family of symmetric equilibria.
Intuitively, we can make a few general predictions about the efficiency
characteristics of the symmetric equilibrium. First, in the absence of any
liability regime, there are likely to be too many victims at each target, since
each victim does not internalize the cost of the risk she imposes on targets.
Second, targets are likely to misallocate self-protection resources, since they
do not account for external effects on other targets, and they do not fully
internalize the welfare of on-site subsidiary victims. Hence, targets, may
expend too much or too little on protection (depending on which of these
effects dominates).40
Efficiency within our model most naturally reduces to maximizing the
summed total expected payoffs of victims and targets (net of loss), conditional on the incentive compatibility constraints of the terrorists.41 To
simplify the notation, note that the number of victims at target i satisfies
vi
1
∗
2 = ki − N , and thus target i is populated by victims over the interval
vi vi
[− 2 , 2 ]. Therefore, total surplus of all victims in the neighborhood of target i (whether they patronize or not) consists of the sum of each victim’s
individual surplus:
µ ¶
Z vi
2
1
G0 + 2 ·
V S (i) =
(G − G0 − γ (x) − ρ (si , ri ) D) dx
(3.9)
N
0
40
These intuitions will be important for our later analysis, since they suggest that the
optimal liability regime involves forcing net payments by victims to the population of
targets, and payments among targets that depend on the net externalities associated with
protection.
41
Note that this formulation does not include the welfare of terrorists, which seems
most natural in this context. It also does not include any other social benefits of reducing
terrorist behavior that are not visited on prospective victims or targets. We explore the
relaxation of this definition below.
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Target surplus consists of expected losses net of protection:
−

N
X

(ρ(si , ri )L + si )

(3.10)

i=1

A ‘socially optimal’ allocation of resources, then, would maximize the
social surplus of victims and targets, taking as given the optimal responses
of terrorists:42
" Z vi
#
N
X
2
2
max
(G − G0 − γ(x) − ρ(si , ri )D) dx − (ρ(si , ri )L + si ) (3.11)
si ,vi

0

i=1

subject to the incentive compatibility constraint:

Γ′ (A) = ρr (si , ri )B(L, vi )

(3.12)

Constraining our analysis to a symmetric equilibrium, this problem simplifies to one of choosing {v̂, ŝ, r̂} to maximize surplus for a representative
target, so that the social welfare function becomes,
Z v̂
2
(G − G0 − γ(x) − ρ(ŝ, r̂)D) dx − ρ(ŝ, r̂)L − ŝ (3.13)
Ψ (r̂, ŝ, v̂) = 2
0

and the social planner’s problem reduces to,

max Ψ (r̂, ŝ, v̂)
v̂,ŝ

(3.14)

subject to
Γ′ (A) = ρr (ŝ, r̂)B(L, v̂)
One way to conceive of the terrorist’s incentive compatibility constraint
is in reduced form, so that the planner chooses both ŝ and v̂ knowing that
terrorists will react optimally, according to the functional r̂ (ŝ, v̂). The conditions for efficiency are:
¶
µ
dr̂
(v̂D + L) =
− ρs + ρr
dŝ
{z
}
|

MC of ŝ

Marginal social Benefit of v̂

Marginal social Cost of v̂

Marginal social Benefit of ŝ

µ
¶
v̂
G − G0 − γ( ) − ρ(ŝ, r̂)D
=
2
{z
}
|

1
|{z}

µ
¶
dr̂
ρr
(v̂D + L) > 0
dv̂
{z
}
|

(3.15)

(3.16)

42
Recall that our definition of social optimality takes terrorists’ actions / reactions a
constraint (as they are assumed outside the regulatory structure). Thus, in reality, this
is a type of constrained second best. Observe also that we are implicitly according equal
weight to the welfare of targets and victims.
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where



X
dr̂ 
dri 
=
dv̂
dvj
j

> 0;
ri =r̂
vi =v̂


X
dr̂ 
dri 
=
dŝ
dsj


j

<0
ri =r̂
si =ŝ

The efficient protection decision accounts for the impact of protection on
total social losses (v̂D + L), which includes both victim and target losses.
The efficient allocation of victims in (3.16) results in strictly positive surplus
for the marginal victim. Comparing (3.16) to the analogous condition (3.5)
characterizing private decisionmaking in a symmetric equilibrium, we see
immediately that the socially optimal level of victim patronage is strictly
less than the privately optimal level. Indeed, when the marginal victim
makes her patronage decision, she does not consider the effect her presence
has on the risks of others. Analysis of the problem leads to the following
proposition,
where ªthe symmetric equilibrium in the no-liability case is given
©
by sN L , v N L , rN L .
The efficiency properties of self-protection decisions by targets, on the
other hand, are more complex. Protection may be inefficiently high or low,
because it involves both positive externalities for potential victims, but negative externalities
³ on other´ targets. Since the private marginal benefit of
dri
protection is − ρs + ρr ds
L, the key comparison comes down to whether
i
the social marginal benefit (which equals unity) is less than the private
marginal benefit evaluated at the social optimum. If social benefit is less
than private benefit, targets are engaging in too much protection. This
condition is equivalent to:
µ
¶¯
1
dri ¯¯
< − ρs + ρr
(3.17)
L
dsi ¯{r̂,ŝ,v̂}
On the other hand, should this strict inequality hold in the opposite direction, the targets engage in too little protection. Simplifying this condition,
we have the following:

Proposition 3.5. Absent a liability regime, and if assumption A1 holds,
victims always over-patronize targets relative to the social optimum, so that
v N L > v̂. Targets, on the other hand, may overprotect or underprotect,
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and in particular they over-protect (sN L > ŝ) if and only if, at the social
optimum {r̂, ŝ, v̂} :
µ
¶¯
1
dri ¯¯
< − ρs + ρr
(3.18)
L
dsi ¯{r̂,ŝ,v̂}
The condition in the above proposition can be equivalently characterized
as: the external marginal benefits of protection in equation 3.15 are negative.

3.3

Liability, Behavior, and Welfare

We now explore the equilibrium with liability rules. In order to consider the
effects of liability, suppose that target i has been successfully attacked, and
has suffered damages L. Moreover, the vi victims at the target have also
suffered damages D each. We now consider each of a family of compensation
schemes. In each case, all targets but the attacked target must make a
transfer payment to target i in the amount of τ −i (si , s−i ). Target i, in turn,
is required to make a transfer payment θi (si , vi ) to the injured victims. (We
do not consider systems under which targets bear liability for other targets’
victims, because these are subsumed by the system we consider).43
Perhaps the simplest form of liability to consider is a form of strict
liability – transfer payments that are mandatory upon proof of harm. We
will consider a family of liability functions, in which each target bears some
responsibility for liability of an attacked target, and each target bears some
responsibility for damages incurred by its own victims. Thus, unaffected
targets’ liability to an affected target i would be given by:
τ −i (s−i , si ) = αL

(3.19)

where the policy parameter α captures the fraction of a target’s loss compensated by other targets. Under this formulation, the total amount received
by i is therefore:
X
τ −i = (N − 1) αL
(3.20)
j6=i

The liability of the attacked target to its own subsidiary victims is:
θi (si , vi ) = βDvi

(3.21)

where the policy parameter β represents the fraction of an individual’s damages compensated by the target. Note that both of these parameters can
43

A payment from target B to the victims at target A can be effected by a transfer
from target B to target A, coupled with one from target A to its victims.
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be either positive or negative, at least in theory (though, as noted above,
there may be practical limitations on expecting that β would ever take on
negative values – a possibility we address below).
The introduction of liability rules such as those above obviously distorts
both targets’ and victims’ choices. In the presence of these transfers, and in
the case of 2 targets, the representative target’s strategic choice becomes:


X
ρ (rj , sj ) αL + si 
max − ρ(ri , si ) · ((1 − (N − 1) α) L + βvi D) +
si

j6=i

(3.22)
Consequently, the target’s optimal choice has the following first order condition:44
µ
µ
¶
¶
drj
dri
dvi X
ρr
−
− ρs + ρr
((1 − (N − 1) α) L + βv1 D)−ρ(ri , si )βD
αL−1 = 0
dsi
dsi
dsi
j6=i

(3.23)
Similarly, with victims, the market-clearing conditions also change to
reflect the damage payments that victims might expect. Under the above
liability regime, this market-clearing condition becomes:
³v ´
G − G0 − γ
− ρ (si , ri ) (1 − β) D = 0 ⇔
(3.24)
2
³v ´
− ρ (si , ri ) D = −ρ (si , ri ) Dβ
G − G0 − γ
2

The terrorist’s structural conditions for maximization remain unchanged, as
terrorists are assumed to be beyond the reach of the tort system.
Under a liability regime, then, the social planner will now anticipate
these distortions and solve the following:
max Ψ (r̂, ŝ, v̂)
v̂,ŝ

subject to
Γ′ (A) = ρr (ŝ, r̂)B(L, v̂)

44

Equation

(3.23)

Equation

(3.24)

Note that in the case of α = β = 0, this condition reduces to:
µ
¶
dri
− ρ s + ρr
L−1=0
dsi

which coincides with the no-liability FOC derived above.
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(3.25)

Analysis of this problem yields the following proposition:
Proposition 3.6. If the policy choice of α and β is unconstrained, and if
(A1) holds, then the optimal strict liability regime (α∗ , β ∗ ) is unique and implements the constrained second-best allocation of the social planner’s problem, {r̂, ŝ, v̂} . The optimal liability regime is given by:
¯
¡ dr̂ ¢
¯
(v̂D
+
L)
−
ρ
¯
r dv̂
β∗ =
¯
¯
ρ (si , ri ) D
{r̂,ŝ,v̂}
³
´
³
¯
P dri ´
dri
¯
∗
∗ dvi
+
ρ
+
ρ
(L
+
β
v̂D)
−
ρ(r
,
s
)β
D
(v̂D
+
L)
− ρs + ρr ds
i
i
¯
s
r
j dsj
dsi
i
∗
¯
´
´ i
³
h ³
α =
P
¯
dr
dri
j
¯
− ρs + ρr ds ((N − 1) L) + j6=i ρr ds L
i

i

Moreover, under this regime, β ∗ < 0, and thus targets always would have
potential cause of action against their subsidiary victims, but not vice versa.
The net transfer of resources from unaffected targets to affected targets is
ambiguous in sign, but increases with the extent of risk-shifting: that is,
dr
i
moving inversely in dsji and in dv
dsi .

Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the above proposition is its implications for victims. Indeed, the socially optimal liability rules require
that victims reimburse affected targets in the event of an attack, and not
vice-versa. This counter-intuitive result is due to the negative externality
victims impose on targets: as noted above victims tend to free-ride off the
protection investments of targets, failing to account for the enhanced risk
their patronage places on other victims and the target itself.
As noted in Section 2, however, it is difficult to believe that allowing a
cause of action against subsidiary victims is a viable policy choice for regulators. Indeed, not only will those defendants be more likely to be judgmentproof, but they will have also suffered significant injuries (or death) themselves, a fact that makes it difficult (perhaps prohibitively so) for a cause
of action against victims to be politically palatable. To account for this
tension, we introduce one more constraint on the regulator’s problem, in
which she is confined to choosing only nonnegative values for β. Adding
this constraint to the regulator’s problem immediately yields the following
proposition:
Proposition 3.7. If the policy choice of α and β is constrained so that
β ≥ 0, then the optimal strict liability regime (α∗c , β ∗c ) does not implement the
constrained second-best social planner’s optimum, but instead implements
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{r̂,ŝ,v̂}

{rc , sc , vc } , where vc > v̂ and rc > r̂. Here, the optimal liability regime is
given by
β∗ = 0
α∗ =

´
³
³
P dri ´
dri
L
+
ρ
+
ρ
− ρs + ρr ds
s
r
j dsj (v̂D + L)
i
´
´
³
³
P
drj
dri
((N
−
1)
L)
+
L
ρ
− ρs + ρr ds
r
j6
=
i
ds
i
i

Under this regime, targets neither have a cause of action against their subsidiary victims, nor do victims have a cause of action against targets. The
net transfer of resources from unaffected targets to affected targets is positive
if and only if, at the social optimum,
µ
¶¯
1
dri ¯¯
< − ρs + ρr
L
dsi ¯{r̂,ŝ,v̂}
and increases with the extent of risk-shifting: that is, moving inversely in
drj
dvi
dsi and in dsi .

Note that the constraints above might be too generous, relative to existing legal templates. Since transfers from a harmed target to unharmed
targets seem legally infeasible, it may be appropriate to impose the additional constraint that α ≥ 0. Under this added constraint, if the optimal
α from Proposition 3.7 were negative, the best feasible liability structure
would be no liability rules at all (α = β = 0).
The next subsection discusses some of the core intuitions behind the
above two propositions.

3.4

Intuition Behind Results

The optimal liability regime is built to solve three basic problems, each of
which contributes to the form of the optimal transfer payments described
above. The easiest way to understand the results in toto is to isolate each
of three market failures: (1) Failure of targets to account for the interests
of victims; (2) External effects of targets on other targets; and (3) External
effects of victims on targets and other victims. Below we show how each of
these factors is captured in the above results. We concentrate on the two
target case for expositional reasons (though the results carry forward to the
N target case).
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3.4.1

Accounting for Victims

The first and most conventional source of market failure is the inability
of targets to account for the interests of their subsidiary victims, absent a
liability regime. To focus attention on this problem, we will suppose that
dr2
= 0, and that victim
there are no external effects of target behavior, ds
1
dr
behavior has no external effects on targets, dv = 0.
In this case, the optimal liability transfers reduce to:
αL = −vD

(3.26)

β=0

(3.27)

In the event of an attack, the target of interest pays the unaffected target
the value of victim losses, but no other transfers are made. Victim behavior
has no external effects on targets, and target behavior has no effects on
other targets. The only inefficient margin of decisionmaking is the target’s
private return to protection, which excludes the expected losses of victims
from an attack and thus fails to match the social return to protection. To
correct this problem, the optimal liability rule requires that the target pay
for victim losses.
Note, however, that this payment does not go to victims. In this environment, victim decisionmaking is exactly efficient: victims do not shift
external risk onto targets. Transfers to victims would only be distortionary.
Moreover, note that the payment being made to the unaffected target is
largely incidental. We could just as easily have required that the target pay
the government a fine equal to victim losses. In this particular case, the
money received by the unaffected target has no impact on its incentives,
because the unaffected target cannot manipulate the risk of attack. In this
case, the unaffected target functions as nothing more than a repository for
the payment made by the damaged target. Therefore, this liability rule can
be equivalently implemented as a fine paid by the affected target, where the
fine is set equal to the value of victim losses. This reinforces the importance
of decoupling liability for victim losses from payments to victims.
3.4.2

External Effects Among Targets

dr2
We now consider external effects among targets, or the possibility that ds
6=
1
0. Without loss of generality, consider the case of target substitution, where
dr2
ds1 > 0, so that protection expenditures by one target cause terrorists to
substitute to another target. In this case, the optimal liability transfer
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becomes:
−1≤·≤0

αL = vD

z

1≥·≥0

}|
dr1
ρs + ρr ds
1

{

dr2
dr1
ρr ds
− (ρs + ρr ds
)
1
1

+L

z

}|
dr2
ρr ds
1

{

dr2
dr1
ρr ds
− (ρs + ρr ds
)
1
1

β = 0
Since victim behavior involves no external effects, there continues to be
no reason to transfer resources to or from victims. However, the fine paid by
the affected target is now partially offset by a transfer from the unaffected
target. The logic here is that the behavior of the other targets contributed
in part to the losses experienced by victims. As a result, the bill for victims’
losses is borne jointly. Similarly, there is also a transfer from the unaffected
target to the affected one, to compensate it for its own losses caused by riskshifting. This transfer is a fraction of the target’s own losses, and represents
the way in which these losses are also borne jointly.
This type of arrangement might be difficult to implement through the
courts, because judges might be reluctant to hold a target liable for being
too secure. However, a mutual insurance pool presents us with a feasible
way of implementing this policy. The pool can be designed to exploit the
fact that the transfer from one target to another is always less than vD + L.
To take the simplest structure—one that lacks any insurance features—
suppose that all potential targets of terrorism contribute vD + L, total
damages in the event of an attack, to a pool. If an attack does not take place,
their money is refunded. If an attack does take place, the affected target
receives back the amount vD + (1 + α)L > 0; this results in a net transfer to
the affected target of size αL. The pool will necessarily have enough funds
on hand to make this transfer, because αL ≤ vD + L. Remaining funds in
the pool are then refunded to the unaffected targets.
If αL > 0, the affected target receives a net transfer, and the pool can
also incorporate an insurance feature. If there are N targets, each can
contributes vD+L
to the pool. In the event of an attack, the affected target
N
can then be paid αL, and the remainder can be refunded to the unaffected
targets. If N is large, this approximates the efficient outcome.
3.4.3

Externalities from Victim Behavior

Finally, we analyze the externalities in victim behavior. If terrorists value
dr1
casualties, so that dv
> 0. This results in inefficiency, because victims do
1
not consider the impact of their behavior on the risk faced by targets.
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Adding the victim externalities introduces a transfer from victims to
the³ affected target,
to account for the risk they shift onto the target: β =
´¡
¢
ρr ∂ r̂
v̂D+L
. This transfer from victims to targets aligns victims’
− ρ ∂v̂ (ŝ, r̂)
D
private margins with social margins, but it actually introduces distortion
into target decisionmaking. When β = 0, the private returns to protection
are exactly equal to the social returns. Nonzero β eliminates this result. As
a result, equation 5.6 incorporates a transfer payment that purges the effect
of β from the target’s decision problem, by causing targets to disgorge a
component of this payment to other targets (capitalized within the transfer
payment going between affected and unaffected targets).
In other words, payment by victims leads to efficient behavior for them,
but channeling this payment to targets can distort targets’ incentives. A
better solution might be to impose payments or fines—or, more realistically,
offer only incomplete insurance to risk-averse victims—on victims, while at
the same time maintaining a mutual pool among targets to correct problems
in their decisionmaking.

4

Caveats and Extensions

Before concluding, we turn briefly to two caveats and/or extensions of our
model. First, we consider alternative liability regimes (such as negligence).
We then consider the effect of more general “public good” dimensions of
target hardening – i.e., the possibility that more impervious targets may
create a general benefit for society because people feel ‘safer.’

4.1

Alternative Liability Approaches

The discussion above has focused exclusively on relatively simple “strict”
liability rules versus no liability. In many ways, this makes sense, given the
fact that these two options are well represented among states (see Section 2
above). Moreover, so long as the regulator’s choice is unrestricted (i.e., β
can be either positive or negative), we demonstrated that a strict liability
system can replicate the outcome of the social planner’s problem. However,
other possible variations exist – particularly variations on negligence rules
– and we turn brief attention such variations here.
Consider first the possibility of a simple negligence regime governing
both target liability to other targets and target liability to victims. Under
a target-on-target regime, liability of an unaffected target to an affected one
turns on whether the that targets have exceeded a prescribed threshold level
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of precautions, sN . Only if an unaffected target’s expenditures exceed this
level will liability be found. Thus, with appropriately large sanctions, it is
always possible to induce targets to implement no more than the prescribed
level of precaution.
On the other hand, implementing a negligence regime for victims is extremely problematic. Indeed, as has already been demonstrated, when victims respond to target-hardening by increased patronage, the case for any liability at all becomes difficult to defend on efficiency grounds. Equivalently,
then, the optimal negligence scheme would place the negligence standard at
zero, so that all firms satisfied it.
Nevertheless, one could envision – at least in theory – a negligence regime
that was based on liability of victims to affected targets. Under this view,
victims would be liable to an attacked target whenever their aggregate patronage of the target exceeded some prescribed threshold level. But such
an approach is even less satisfactory on pragmatic grounds than strict liability of victims to targets. First, just as with strict liability, victims may be
liquidity-constrained, and not in a position even to make damages payments
to targets. Second, because each victim contributes only a portion of the
overall congestion in a given target, it is virtually impossible to implement
a negligence rule for victims: indeed, this would require identifying the victim(s) that effectively “caused” overall patronage to exceed the level that is
prescribed by the negligence standard.
Consequently, the optimal negligence rule in our model would look very
much like the optimal strict liability rule: victims would have no cause of
action against attacked targets, but attacked targets would have a potential cause of action against other targets if the degree of risk-shifting were
sufficiently high.45

4.2

Public Goods

In focusing on incentive effects, we did not discuss the role of public goods in
protection against terrorism (see Lakdawalla and Zanjani, 2005). If society
is particularly interested in the patronage of certain landmark buildings or
downtown areas, there may be social reasons to compensate victims in the
event of a terrorist attack. Similarly, if there is a public good associated with
the construction of landmark buildings that might be more heavily targeted
by terrorists, society may have incentives to encourage such building by
providing additional protection against terrorism.
45

A similar set of arguments would apply to other variations on negligence, such as
comparative and contributory negligence. We therefore omit them in our analysis.
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These types of victim compensation plans can be deployed in conjunction with liability arrangements. Perfectly insuring victims against losses
has undesirable incentive effects, but partial compensation from society to
victims may promote the public good while still retaining efficient incentives
to avoid high-profile targets.
Similarly, there may be public goods associated with building in highprofile downtown areas. This may justify transfers, perhaps in the form
of subsidized terrorism insurance, from society to the targets of terrorism.
Such transfers can be incorporated into the mutual insurance pool described
above, by allowing taxpayers to contribute to the pool and thus implicitly
underwrite insurance against terrorist attacks.

5

Concluding Remarks

This paper has considered the appropriate role of civil liability in the wake
of a terrorist act, under the assumption that terrorists themselves (and those
controlling them) are beyond the reach of courts. We have demonstrated
that it is possible in theory to design a liability regime that induces an efficient allocation of precaution. In practice, however, such a regime required
would extremely difficult (if not impossible) to implement. In particular,
under plausible conditions, the optimal liability regime involves transfers
from victims to affected targets, and possibly even from affected targets to
unaffected targets. Such transfers seem unlikely (and even absurd) under
traditional doctrinal templates within tort law. Moreover, they would offer
few (if any) advantages over a simpler approach involving mutual insurance
for targets and direct compensation to victims.
There are a number of relatively simple extensions to our analysis that,
we conjecture, would complicate it but not reverse our findings. Introducing
risk-aversion into our model, for example, would likely have only minor
effects for our incentive story, but might make litigation a more attractive
insurance vehicle. At the same time, of course, introducing risk aversion
would also make insurance an even more attractive insurance vehicle, since
it spreads risks more efficiently across individuals.
Similarly, introducing incomplete information would also likely have ambiguous changes on our results. Indeed, if agents were widely uninformed or
misinformed, liability probably would have even less of a role to play, since
(a) it is not clear what incentives agents will respond to, and (b) judges
are likely to be similarly afflicted by a lack of information, inhibiting their
ability to apply liability rules appropriately. On the other hand, asymmet-

36

ric information might provide some grounds for a liability regime that shifts
much of the risk onto the party (or parties) with the best information. A
significant difficulty with such an approach in this context, however, is the
task of identifying a well-informed agent. Apart from the government, it is
not clear which agents in society have above average information about the
risk of terrorism or the effectiveness of protective investments.46
There is, however, one crucial distinguishing feature of terrorism that
we have not considered at great length: the “public good” value of national
security or prestige. Terrorism policy is made in the context of a war effort,
where terrorists seek to undermine national confidence and security. Because
defeating that goal may constitute a public good, victim compensation may
be an appropriate and welfare-enhancing way to induce individuals to continue with normal life in the face of terrorism risk. Moreover, as noted above,
if security has a sufficiently large public good value, then the optimal liability regime may align more coherently with existing tort law templates. But
even so, if one were convinced that the public good value of security were
this important, it is difficult to understand why targets alone should pick
up the tab. Direct compensation from the government, in fact, may still be
preferable to liability. Contributing to this conclusion is the government’s
own set of terrorism incentives: although not analyzed above, government
actions themselves often influence terrorism risk, perhaps more than any
other private actor we have considered; payments from the government may
sometimes make general sense on pure incentive grounds as well.
Viewed in this light, the September 11 Victims’ Compensation Fund was
well-conceived, but may not have gone far enough to preclude opt-out tort
claims. In the end, more research is likely needed on public goods provision as it relates to terrorism and liability incentives. This paper hopefully
provides a helpful first step.

46

Although not explored at length here, relaxing the assumption of symmetric distributions of targets and victims would be unlikely to change our qualitative conclusions, which
emanate exclusively from marginal optimization conditions. Asymmetrically distributed
targets, however, might imply the optimality of target-specific liability parameters (α and
β) however, but whose qualitative characteristics would still correspond to the propositions
above.
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Appendix
This appendix clarifies (in very rough form) some of the variable construction from the text, as well as providing proofs of the propositions (when
necessary).

A.1

Variable Construction

A.2

Terrorist Comparative Statics

In the two-target case (the N-target case is virtually identical), the terrorists’
first order conditions can be written as:
Γ′ (A) − ρr (s1 , r1 )B(L, v1 ) = 0
′

(5.1)

Γ (A) − ρr (s2 , r2 )B(L, v2 ) = 0

(5.2)

R − A − r 1 − r2 = 0

(5.3)

Assuming a symmetric equilibrium with two targets (i.e., r1 = r2 = re )
and differentiating with respect to s1 yields the relationships between terror
investments and target protection:
ρ B(Γ′′ + ρrr B)
∂r1
= ′′rs2
<0
∂s1
(Γ ) − (Γ′′ + ρrr B)2
∂r2
(−Γ′′ )(ρrs B)
= ′′ 2
≥0
∂s1
(Γ ) − (Γ′′ + ρrr B)2
∂A
ρ ρ B2
= ′′ 2 rs rr
>0
∂s1
(Γ ) − (Γ′′ + ρrr B)2

(5.4)

These expressions
¯ ¯ ¯ also
¯ demonstrate the implication of deterrence cited in
¯ ∂r1 ¯ ¯ ∂r2 ¯
the text: ¯ ∂s1 ¯ > ¯ ∂s1 ¯
The comparative static relationships between victim choices and terrorist
decisions are similar. In the symmetric two-target case, differentiating with
respect to v1 reveals that:
ρ Bv (Γ′′ + ρrr B)
∂r1
= ′′r 2
>0
∂v1
(Γ ) − (Γ′′ + ρrr B)2
∂r2
(−Γ′′ ) (ρr Bv )
= ′′ 2
<0
∂v1
(Γ ) − (Γ′′ + ρrr B)2
∂A
ρ Bv ρ B
= ′′ 2 r ′′ rr
<0
∂v1
(Γ ) − (Γ + ρrr B)2
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(5.5)

These expressions demonstrate that an increase in protection by any
one
the aggregate number of victims exposed to terrorism:
¯ increases
¯
¯ ¯target
¯ ∂r1 ¯ ¯ ∂r2 ¯
¯ ∂v1 ¯ > ¯ ∂v1 ¯

A.3

Victim Comparative Statics

Differentiating the equilibrium condition for the marginal victim yields the
following expressions:
dv1
ds1

dv1
ds1

d
→
−
[2θ (G − G0 − ρ (si , ri (−
s ,→
v )) D)]
ds1
¸¶
µ
·
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∂v1 ∂s1 ∂s1
⇔
³
´
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−
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−
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′
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=

dv1
ds2
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ds2
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−
[2θ (G − G0 − ρ (si , ri (−
s ,→
v )) D)]
ds2
µ
·
¸¶
∂r1 ∂v1 ∂r1
′
= 2θ (G − G0 − ρ (si , ri ) D) · −ρr D
+
∂v1 ∂s2 ∂s2
⇔
³
´
∂r1
2θ′ (G − G0 − ρ (si , ri ) D) · −ρr D ∂s
2
´ <0
³
=
∂r1
1 + 2θ′ (G − G0 − ρ (si , ri ) D) · ρr D ∂v
1
=

These equations also imply the result given in the text, that:
¯ ¯
¯ ¯
¯
¯
¯ ∂v1 ¯ ¯ ∂v1 ¯ ¯ ∂v2 ¯
¯>¯
¯=¯
¯
¯
¯ ∂s1 ¯ ¯ ∂s2 ¯ ¯ ∂s1 ¯

A.4

Equilibrium for Victims

The victims’ first order conditions are:
γ (v1 ) + ρ (s1 , r1 (v1 , v2 , s1 , s2 )) D − ∆G = 0
γ (v2 ) + ρ (s2 , r2 (v1 , v2 , s1 , s2 )) D − ∆G = 0
which have an associated Jacobian:
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J=

"

γ ′ (v1 ) + ρr (s1 , r1 ) D ·
∂r2
ρr (s2 , r2 ) D · ∂v
1

∂r1
∂v1

∂r1
ρr (s1 , r1 ) D · ∂v
2
γ ′ (v2 ) + ρr (s2 , r2 ) D ·

∂r2
∂v2

#

,

which in turn has determinant:
µ
¶ µ
¶
∂r1
∂r1
′
′
|J| =
γ (v1 ) + ρr (s1 , r1 ) D ·
· γ (v2 ) + ρr (s2 , r2 ) D ·
∂v1
∂v1
µ
¶ µ
¶
∂r1
∂r2
− ρr (s1 , r1 ) D ·
· ρr (s2 , r2 ) D ·
∂v2
∂v1
Evaluated at a symmetric equilibrium, we know that r1 = r2 = re ; s1 =
∂ri ∂r1
∂ri
∂r2
∂r2
∂r1
= ∂v
= ∂v
;
= ∂v
= ∂v
. And thus we have:
s2 = se , v1 = v2 = ve , ∂v
1
2
1
i ∂v2
j
µ
µ
¶
¶
∂ri 2
∂ri 2
′
|J| =
γ (ve ) + ρr (se , re ) D ·
− ρr (se , re ) D ·
∂vi
∂vj
> 0
where i = 1,¯ 2. We
¯ sign
¯ can
¯ this determinant as positive since, as demon¯ ∂ri ¯ ¯ ∂ri ¯
strated above, ¯ ∂vi ¯ > ¯ ∂v−i ¯ .
Now consider how a change in s1 affects equilibrium values of v.The
vector of s1 derivatives of the victims’ market clearing condition is:
#
"
∂r1
D
ρs + ρr ∂s
1
∂r2
ρr ∂s
D
1
Note that both of these terms are positive. The substituted Jacobian is
therefore:
"
#
∂r1
∂r1
ρs + ρr ∂s
D
ρ
(s
,
r
)
D
·
1
1
r
∂v
1
2
J=
,
∂r2
∂r2
ρr ∂s
D
γ ′ (v2 ) + ρr (s2 , r2 ) D · ∂v
1
2
which, when evaluated at a symmetric equilibrium, has determinant:



(−)
(−)
(−)
(−)
(−)
(−)
z }| { z }| { (+) z }| { z }| {
z}|{  ∂ri ∂ri ∂ri ∂rj 
¡z ′ }| ¢{ z }| { 
∂ri ∂ri
 ′
+
ρs + Dρr 
−
|J1 | = γ (ve ) ρs + (Dρr ) γ (ve )

∂si ∂vi

 ∂vi ∂si ∂vj ∂si 
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If the square bracketed term is weakly negative, then |J1 | < 0. But this
is clearly satisfied, since we know from above that the own partials on ri
have higher absoluate value than the cross partials on ri . Thus, we have:
³
´´
³
∂ri ∂rj
∂ri ∂ri
′ (v ) ρ ) + Dρ
′ (v ) ∂ri + ∂ri ρ + Dρ
−
(γ
γ
e
e
s
r
s
r
∂si
∂vi
∂vi ∂si
∂v−i ∂si
∂v1
|J1 |
>0
=−
=−
´2 ³
´
³
∂s1
|J|
∂ri
∂ri
−
ρ
(s
,
r
)
D
·
γ ′ (ve ) + ρr (se , re ) D · ∂v
e
e
r
∂vj
i

Now consider comparative statics on v2 .The substituted Jacobian is:
#
"
∂r1
∂r1
ρ
+
ρ
D
γ ′ (v1 ) + ρr (s1 , r1 ) D · ∂v
s
r ∂s1
1
,
J2 =
∂r2
∂r2
ρr (s2 , r2 ) D · ∂v
ρ
r
∂s1 D
1

which, when evaluated at a symmetric equilibrium, has determinant:
·
¸¶
∂ri
∂ri ∂rj
∂ri ∂ri
∂ri
−
ρ + Dρr
−
|J2 | = ρr D γ (ve )
∂sj
∂vj s
∂vi ∂si
∂vj ∂si

 

(+)
(+)
z }| ∂r { z∂r}| {

 i 
2
= ρr D γ ′ (ve )
ρ 
−
∂s1   ∂vj s 

µ

′

Thus, we have

∂v2
=−
∂s1

³
∂ri
−
ρr D γ ′ (ve ) ∂s
j

∂ri
∂vj ρs

|J|

´

This derivative is negative so long as:
γ ′ (ve )
′

∂r2
∂s1

γ (ve )

<
⇔
<

∂r2
ρ
∂v1 s
ρr ρs Bv
ρrs B

The interpretation here is simple: So long as the “crowding” effect on a
target is not “too” large, victims will tend to flock away from targets that
have lower relative protection. When crowding effects are large, on the
other hand, hardening a target will induce more victims to enter the risky
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activities, so much so that some of them may choose to spend time at the
unhardened target (realizing that, in equilibrium, terrorists will be spending
less effort to attack it).

A.5

Proof of Proposition 3.5

The proposition follows immediately from the textual analysis, and the proof
is therefore omitted.

A.6

Proof of Proposition 3.6

The unconstrained liability problem can be solved in two stages. Victim
behavior only depends on β. Target behavior depends on both. So we
proceed by fixing β optimally, and fixing α optimally given β.
Recall that the social optimum for v̂ is characterized by:
µ
¶
µ ¶
dr̂
v̂
− ρ(ŝ, r̂)D = ρr
(v̂D + L)
G − G0 − γ
2
dv̂

whereas the market clearing condition for victims is:
³v ´
G − G0 − γ
− ρ (si , ri ) D = −ρ (si , ri ) Dβ
2
Evaluating both expressions at the social optimum and substituting allows
us to solve for β by setting the RHS of the two above expressions equal to
one another:
¡ dr̂ ¢
(v̂D + L)
− ρr dv̂
∗
β =
ρ (si , ri ) D
Given this value of β, we consider the target’s optimal choice, similarly
comparing it to the social optimum, so that (after substitution):
µ
¶
¶
µ
drj
dvi X
dri
ρr
+
((1 − (N − 1) α) L + βv1 D) + ρ(ri , si )βD
αL
ρs + ρr
dsi
dsi
dsi
j6=i


X dri
 (v̂D + L)
= ρs + ρr
dsj
j

Solving the above expression for α yields:
³
´
³
P dri ´
dvi
dri
+
ρ
+
ρ
(L
+
βv
D)
−
ρ(r
,
s
)βD
− ρs + ρr ds
1
i
i
s
r
j dsj (v̂D + L)
dsi
i
´
´ i
³
h ³
α∗ =
P
dr
dri
((N − 1) L) + j6=i ρr dsji L
− ρs + ρr ds
i
QED.
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A.7

Proof of Proposition 3.7

Since the constraint on β must be binding, we know that β = 0. Substituting
this value into the target’s optimality condition, and comparing to the social
optimality condition allows us to solve for α as follows:
³
´
³
P dri ´
dri
− ρs + ρr ds
L
+
ρ
+
ρ
s
r
j dsj (v̂D + L)
i
´
³
α=
(5.6)
P ³ drj ´
dri
((N
−
1)
L)
+
L
− ρs + ρr ds
ρ
r dsi
j6=i
i

It is easily confirmed from the target’s FOC that
dsi
<0
dα

and thus the target will be a net recipient if and only if its level of protection
was inefficiently high in the absence of liability. This condition is tantamount
to the inequality condition given in the proposition.
The first expression is straightforward: paying victims in the event of
a loss makes them less averse to such a loss. In the second expression, the
effect of target transfers on victims depends entirely on how these affect
target protection. If target transfers increase the level of protection, they
draw more victims in, and vice-versa. QED
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